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[Same-sex marriage] makes me uncomfortable, same as anybody
else.'
- Governor Howard Dean
I. INTRODUCTION

Howard Dean reminds homosexual men and women where they live.2
They live in a country where even an outspoken liberal3 identifies with
Americans who are uncomfortable with gaymarriage.4 Because Governor
Dean signed into law the country's only civil union legislation, such a
statement speaks volumes. It can be gleaned from such a statement that the
climate in the United States is not conducive to same-sex marriage. Thus,
a decision is in order. As the legal question of marriage rises to
prominence, proponents of same-sex marriage need to consider the
possibility that the title "marriage" is too hotly protected. Perhaps winning
the rights that married couples get without winning the title is the best that
can be done.
Dr. Dean was responding to a question that more and more politicians
must encounter. The legal question of same-sex marriage has come to the
forefront since the Supreme Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick5 in
Lawrence v. Texas.6 The newsweeklies and cable news talk shows have
1. Afi-Odelia E. Scruggs, Same-Sex MarriageNot the Real Issue, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER,
Jan. 10, 2000, at lB.
2. The reader should note that our argument, while explicitly mentioning gays and lesbians,
is meant for all same-sex couples including bisexuals in same-sex relationships.
3. Matt Bai, Dr.No andthe Yes Men, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 1,2003, at 46. Howard Dean,
Governor of Vermont, was one of the more outspoken Democratic Presidential candidates for the
2004 election. Id.
4. For an extensive study on public opinion regarding same-sex marriage and
homosexuality, see generally Clyde Wilcox & Robin Wolpert, Gay Rights in the Public Sphere:
Public Opinion on Gay andLesbian Equality,in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 409-432 (Craig A.
Rimmerman et al. eds., 2000).
5. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The majority found that the constitutional
right of privacy does not protect consensual homosexual sexual relations when committed within
the privacy ofa person's home. Id. at 190. Consequently, sodomy statues criminalized homosexual
sex, which served to legitimize discrimination ofhomosexual persons. See JOYCE MURDOCH& DEB
PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 316 (2001). The

authors argue that as a result ofthe Hardwickopinion, which considered homosexual intimacy antifamily, the anti-gay marriage argument became reinforced. Id. at 316-17. For a more in depth
discussion, see Diana Hassel, The Use of Criminal Sodomy Laws in Civil Litigation, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 813 (2001).
6. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling, the
illegality of sodomy in many states was often cited as reason for prohibiting same-sex marriages
(or unions). See generally id. Thus, the Supreme Court ruling removes at least one legal obstacle
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given attention to this legal topic which is sure to gain prominence in the
coming months.7 People are wondering what the cover of Newsweek put
so succinctly: "Is Gay Marriage next?" 8
The answer is almost certainly, "NO!" The Defense of Marriage Act9
(DOMA) passed at the federal level'" and subsequent "baby DOMAs" in
to same-sex marriage or unions. See generallyid.Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, lamented
that:
Today's opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted
a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as
formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of
homosexual conduct is "no legitimate state interest"... what justification could
there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples
exercising "the liberty protected by the Constitution." Surely not the
encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to
marry. This case "does not involve" the issue of homosexual marriage if one
entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions
of this Court.

Id.
at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
7. The prominence of the same-sex marriage issue significantly increased after President
George W. Bush's July 30,2003 news conference in which he firmly opposed same-sex marriages.
See infra text accompanying note 25.
8. See Evan Thomas, The War Over Gay Marriage,NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, at 38,
availableat 2003 WL 8639382.
9. The Defense of Marriage Act, signed in 1996 by President Bill Clinton, has two
provisions. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738C and I U.S.C. § 7). The first provision defines marriage, for federal purposes, as
only between heterosexuals:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation,
or interpretation ofthe various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
See 28 U.S.C. § 7 (2004). The second provision states that:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect of any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons
of the same sex .that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State,
territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2004).
10. "Baby DOMAs" were passed in various states to preempt the possibility that all states
might have to recognize the same-sex marriage of another state. Both Hawaiian and Alaskan
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various states" almost certainly deny the possibility of same-sex
marriage" within those states in the foreseeable future. 3 Alaska and
Hawaii serve as especially illustrative examples 4 ofthe potential backlash
against same-sex marriage. 5 Both states had judicial decisions granting

judicial decisions allowing for same-sex marriage brought this possibility to the fore and because
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a federal law was needed. See Diane M. Guillerman, The
Defense of MarriageAct: The Latest Maneuver in the Continuing Battle to Legalize Same-Sex
Marriage,34 HOUS. L. REV. 425, 442 (1997).
11. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE
FuTURE OF GAY RIGHTS (2002). As of June 2001, thirty-four states have enacted the so-called
"junior DOMAs" barring the recognition of out of state same-sex marriage, fearful that a sister state
might eventually recognize same-sex marriage. Id. at 135. Additionally, two states, Alaska and
Hawaii, now have constitutional amendments allowing for marriage to be defined as the union of
one man and one woman. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25.; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; see also
MARTIN DUPUIS, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, LEGAL MOBILIZATION, & THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS (2002).

The thirty-five states that passed laws denying same-sex marriage are as follows: Alabama (1998),
Alaska (1998), Arizona (1996), Arkansas (1997), California (2000), Colorado (2000), Delaware
(1996), Florida (1997), Georgia (1996), Hawaii (1998), Idaho (1996), Illinois (1996), Indiana
(1997), Kansas (1996), Louisiana (1999), Maine (1997), Michigan (1996), Minnesota (1997),
Mississippi (1997), Montana (1997), Nebraska (2000), New Jersey (2001), New York (2001), North
Carolina (1996), North Dakota (1997), Oklahoma (1996), Pennsylvania (1996), South Carolina
(1996), South Dakota (1997), Tennessee (1996), Utah (1995), Virginia (1997), Washington (1998),
and West Virginia (2000). Id. at 76, tbl.4. 1.
12. See E. Todd Wilkowski, The Defense of MarriageAct: Will It be the Final Word in the
Debate Over Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Unions?, 8 REGENT U. L. REV. 195 (1997).
13. See Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex
Marriagein the UnitedStates andEurope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2004, 2013-14 (2003) [hereinafter
Differing Paths].
The impact offederalism on the same-sex marriage movement in the United States
is apparent in the absence of reform at the federal level and in the occasional farreaching reforms that have occurred in various states and localities. Congress's
1996 enactment of the DOMA seriously set back efforts to legalize same-sex
marriage nationally.
Id. at 2013.
14. It could be argued that the Hawaii, Alaska, and Vermont cases were part of a paradigm
shift rather than a usurpation of legislative power by the judiciary, or "legislating from the bench."
See Jeffrey J. Swart, The Wedding Luau - Who is Invited?: Hawaii, Same-Sex Marriage, and
Emerging Realities, 43 EMORY L.J. 1577 (1994).
15. See DUPUIs, supra note 11, at 71-93.
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same-sex couples the right to marry. 16 Both states failed to implement the
decisions of their courts. 7 The overwhelming public outcrys to insert a
16. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,48 (Haw. 1993). The Hawaii Supreme Court held that
the Hawaiian marriage law discriminated on the basis of sex, thus requiring strict scrutiny of the
statute. Id. at 67. The Baehr court ordered a trial to determine whether the state had a compelling
interest in the laws that would justify sex-based discrimination. Id. at 68. The lower court found the
marriage law unconstitutional because the state failed to prove that the state had a compelling
interest in sex-based discrimination in issuing marriage licenses. See Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 911394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The state appealed its case to the Hawaii
Supreme Court, yet the point was moot before it could rule on the issue. While awaiting the Hawaii
Supreme Court's opinion, the state legislature asked for the public's approval of an amendment to
the state constitution that reserved for the legislature the right to define marriage as the union of
a man and a woman. See supra text accompanying note 11; see also Brause v. Bureau of Vital
Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562C1, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27 1998). The Alaskatrial
court became the first to hold that the right to choose one's marriage partner is a fundamental right,
as afforded by the state constitution's guarantee to the right to privacy. Id. at 6. The trial court ruled
that:
The relevant question is not whether same-sex marriage is so rooted in our
traditions that it is a fundamental right, but whether the freedom to choose one's
It is the decision itself that is
life partner is so rooted in our tradition ....
fundamental, whether the decision results in a traditional choice or the
nontraditional choice.... The same constitution protects both.
Id. at 4,6. The trial court's order to issue a marriage license to the same-sex couple was postponed
while the state sought an appellate review. Before the appellate court could issue a ruling, a
constitutional amendment was easily passed in both houses of the legislature and by the voting
public to define marriage as between one man and one woman, making any appellate decision
moot. See id.
17. See generallyArthur S. Leonard, Ten PropositionsAboutLegalRecognition ofSame-Sex
Partners,30 CAP. U. L. REV. 343 (2002). In light of the author's claim that, "[i]t is unlikely legal
marriage for same-sex couples in the United States will be achieved solely through litigation," the
ineffectiveness of the judicial mechanisms to allow same-sex marriage is not surprising. Id. at 348.
18. The public outcry against same-sex marriage in both Hawaii and Alaska was
demonstrated in local newspaper editorials and in the public support for state constitutional
amendments against same-sex marriage. See Will Lester, Poll FindsMajorityAgainst Gay Unions,
CandidatesMay Face Threat of Backlash, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 19, 2003, at 2, availableat 2003
WL 57436548. Sixty-eight percent of Alaskans voted in favor of the Alaskan constitutional
amendment, leaving only thirty-two percent ofthe voting public in opposition. See id. Strong public
sentiment against the notion of same-sex marriage remains in the wake of Lawrence. Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003); Lester, supra. An Associated Press poll, conducted from August 812, 2003, found that fifty-two percent of those polled favor a law banning gay marriages, while
forty-one percent oppose such a law. See id. The belief that marriage should remain between a man
and a woman is so prevalent that fifty-five percent of those polled would support a constitutional
amendment barring gay marriage and specifying that marriage can only exist between one man and
one woman; only forty-two percent oppose such an amendment. See id. A February 5-8, 2004 Poll
found that forty-nine percent opposed a federal constitutional amendment banning same-sex
marriage, while forty-two percent favored it. Will Lester, Poll: Gay Marriage Unpopular with
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definition of marriage as one man and one woman into the states'
constitutions 9 eclipsed judicial efforts to legalize same-sex marriage in
both states.2" Today, vigorous calls for a constitutional amendment
banning same-sex marriage at the federal level have begun anew,2'
following recent victories for the advancement of same-sex marriage.22
Vermont's expansion of rights to same-sex couples did not meet the
same fate. Proponents of same-sex marriage must wonder what was
different about the Vermont case.23 One notable difference is that
Most, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 10, 2004, at 7A, availableat 2004 WL 67632255. The February
2004 poll also found that the majority of respondents, in a 2 to I margin, said that they oppose a
law legalizing same-sex marriage. Id. See alsoSusan Page, Americans Less Tolerant on Gay Issues,
USA TODAY, July 29,2003, at IA. The Page article, citing a July 2003 USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup
Poll, reports that after several years of increased tolerance towards same-sex relations, public
opinion is returning to the more traditional attitudes of the early and mid-1990s. Id. The author
attributes the shift in attitudes to a public backlash resulting from the Lawrence v. Texas decision,
legalized gay marriage in Canada, and recent expansions ofanti-discrimination policies in the work
place. Id.
19. The alteration of state constitutions denying same-sex couples the right to marry raised
constitutional questions on the federal level. See, e.g., Kevin G. Clarkson et al., The Alaska
MarriageAmendment: The People'sChoice on the Last Frontier,16 ALASKA L. REV. 213 (1999)
(defending the constitutionality of Alaska's constitutional amendment banning same-sex
marriages).
20. See Jeffrey Rosen, How to Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, at 48.
The author warns that "relying on courts for victories that you are unable to win in the legislatures
is not a recipe for enduring success." Id.
21. See Alan Cooperman, Opponents of Gay MarriageDivided: At Issue is Scope of an
Amendment, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2003, at AO1.
At least three versions of the amendment [banning same-sex marriage] are
circulating in Washington. The leading text, and the only one introduced in
Congress, is two sentences: "Marriage in the United States shall consist only of
the union of a man and a woman. Neither this constitution or the constitution of
any state, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status
or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups."
Id.
22. Recent victories include the Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
2472 (2003), the decision of the Canadian government to allow same-sex marriage, Halpern v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 65 O.R. 3d 161, and the Massachusetts Supreme Court
decision, Goodridgev. Dep 't ofPub. Health,798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). These decisions have perhaps
served to solidify and strengthen national opposition to same-sex marriage and bolster support for
proposed constitutional amendments prohibiting future legalization of same-sex marriage.
23. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). A five-judge panel in Vermont heard
statutory and constitutional arguments concerning Vermont's refusal to grant marriage licenses to
three same-sex couples. See id. The Baker court's finding was unanimous; by refusing to grant
marriage licenses to three same-sex couples the state was discriminating against the couples in
violation of the Vermont Constitution. Id. at 886. The decision was suspended to allow the state
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Vermont 24 bestowed all the rights of marriage on same-sex couples without
infringing upon the apparently sacrosanct 2 word "marriage."26 This
difference is the primary reason we argue for the instatement of civil
unions now, rather than just fighting uphill for the legalization of same-sex
marriage without foreseeable results.27
Despite recent court decisions removing some of the barriers to marital
equality for gay and lesbian couples, it remains unlikely that same-sex
marriage will soon become a national reality. For instance, a recent victory
for same-sex couples in Massachusetts does not suggest that same-sex
marriage is a viable strategy for those interested in securing marital rights

legislature time to remedy the discrimination. Id. at 889. The Vermont legislature's remedy came
in the form of a new institution granting the same rights and responsibilities as marriage: civil
unions. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
LAW 141-42 (2002) (critiquing the Vermont Supreme Court's handling of the case). Because the
possibility of same-sex marriage has brought about constitutional amendments in two states, it is
possible that the Vermont Supreme Court tempered its ruling to avoid a backlash by referendum.
See id The question is did the judges abdicate their duty of fairness in favor of expediency? See
id. Koppelman asserts the question is worth asking. See id.
24. See Mark Stasser, EqualProtectionat the Crossroads:On Baker, Common Benefits, and
FacialNeutrality, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 935, 942-43 (2000). Following Vermont's lead to the letter
could prove to be dangerous. Id. at 942. The logic in the Baker v. State decision, which called the
denial of marital rights to same-sex couples discriminatory, rests on the Vermont Constitution's
Common Benefits Clause. Id.Sister states attempting to follow Vermont's lead may erroneously
think that an analogous clause in their state's constitution is necessary for the enacting of civil
unions. Id. at 942-43. Strasser suggests that the remedy to this problem is a wider interpretation of
the federal equal protection clause than was afforded by the Baker court. Id. at 943.
25. See generallyNeil A. Lewis, From the Rose Garden: Same-Sex Marriage;Bush Backs
Bid to Block Gays from Marrying, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at Al. President George W. Bush
told reporters at a press conference that he intended to insure that "marriage" remains between a
man and a woman. Id.The White House spokesman, Scott McClellan, said, "We are looking at
what may be needed legally to protect the sanctity of marriage." Id. The White House continued
to use religious language in its stance on what is a secular governmental issue. See id. President
Bush, in a questionable approach to seem tolerant said: "I am mindful that we're all sinners ....
[A]nd I caution those who may try to take the speck out of their neighbor's eye when they got [sic)
a log in their own." Id.
26. See Lynne Marie Kohm, How Will the Proliferation and Recognition of Domestic
PartnershipsAffect Marriage?,4 J.L. & FAM. STuD. 105, 113-15 (2002). "Clearly the essence of
marriage is what sets it apart from other 'marriage-like' arrangements, like cohabitation, domestic
partnerships, or relationship contracts. This essence is embodied in the requirements for entry into
marriage, and it is precisely this essence that is lacking in other options." Id. at 114. The author
continues: "[h]ow will the recognition of domestic partnerships affect marriage? The domestic
partnerships and relationships formed by cohabitation.., will downgrade marriage, and they will
dilute and weaken marriage." Id. at 115.
27. We certainly do not argue that the fight for same-sex marriage should be ceased, just that
the rights associated with marriage are important enough to be wanted in a more timely manner
than the uphill battle for marriage will allow.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLIC POLICY

(Vol. 15

in other, more conservative, states.2" Civil unions still make sense after the
Massachusetts decision because there is no reason that the fight for legal
equality through civil unions should not be waged concurrently to a fight
for symbolic equality through legal marriage.
Arguments made for the legalization of same-sex marriage often cite
the need for equal treatment of same-sex and different-sex couples in
terms of rights29 afforded by marriage.30 Married people have rights to
hospital visitation, insurance benefits, and adoption that unmarried people
simply do not have.3 Same-sex couples are barred from using marriage as
an avenue to gain these rights, and the demos has made its statement on
the topic loud and clear with the enactment of DOMA.32 Consequently, an
important first step toward parity between same-sex and different-sex

28. See M. NEEL BROWNE & STUART M. KEELEY, ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS 103-04
(2000 6th ed.) (discussing fallacious reasoning of "searching for perfect solutions").
29. For additional discussion of the rights that arise after marriage, see Stacey Lynne Boyle,
Note, MaritalStatus Classifications:ProtectingHomosexual and Heterosexual Cohabitors, 14
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 111, 115-16 (1986); JONATHAN GOLDBERG-HILLER, THE LIMITS TO UNION:
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2002).
30. See Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Fashioninga Tolerable Domestic PartnersStatute in an
EnvironmentHostile to Same-Sex Marriages,7 LAW & SEXUALITY 55, 66-72 (1997). The state and
federal governments grant certain rights to married couples that researchers Nancy K. Kubasek,
Kara Jennings and Shannon T. Browne argue should also be afforded to same-sex couples. See id.
Those rights include, but are not limited to:
(1) parental rights, including foster care, adoption, joint parenting, and visitation
rights; (2) local, state, and federal entitlement benefits, including social security,
veterans, unemployment, and worker's compensation benefits; (3) employee
benefits such as group insurance, family health care, and the assumption of
pension rights if a partner dies; (4) the right to bring a tort action for wrongful
death or loss of consortium; (5) housing rights; (6) local, state, and federal tax
benefits, including the ability to file joint income tax returns; (7) the right to
receive the partner's property through intestate succession; (8) qualification for
immigration status; (9) legal rights to protection in cases of domestic violence;
(10) the right to legal divorce or dissolution proceedings; and (11) the privilege
of not having to testify against one's partner.
Id. at 66-67.
31. Id. at 67-72.
32. See generally, KOPPELMAN, supra note 23, at 140. Koppelman argues that DOMA is
"unnecessary and mean-spirited" and only serves to furnish "ammunition to enemies [of the act]."
DOMA reveals the general attitude of legislators toward same-sex couples and homosexuals in
general. See id.
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couples would be to guarantee marital rights to all couples.13 Civil unions
could provide such a guarantee. If marital rights are truly condign for
same-sex couples,34 why wait for 3people to become 36comfortable with the
extension of the word "marriage" to such unions?
The argument proceeds as follows. Section II outlines evidence
revealing that substantive resistance to same-sex marriage is semantic in
nature. An exploration of relevant case law shows how courts continuously
rely on definitional arguments for maintaining matrimonial prohibition.
Section III addresses counterclaims to our assertions, including arguments
from dignity and analogies to segregation. Section IV suggests that bit by
bit, through statutes and judicial decisions, parity for same-sex couples is
attainable. Also, Section IV includes warnings not to treat recent victories
in the courts as immediate harbingers of equality. DOMA is still the law
of the land, Massachusetts notwithstanding.
This Article seeks to find some middle ground in a discourse with few
moderate words. 37 Legal writers on this topic tend to gravitate toward a
few select conclusions. For example, they either suggest the immediate
33. See, e.g., Ryan Nishimoto, MarriageMakes Cents: How Law & Economics Justifies
Same-Sex Marriage,23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 379, 394-96 (2003) (book review of ANDREW
KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW (2002)).

34. According to the General Accounting Office of the U.S. Congress, at least 1049 federal
laws provide rights, benefits, and privileges on the basis of marital status. All of these rights are
currently denied to same-sex couples. See General Accounting Office, GAO/OGC-97-16 (Jan. 3 1,
1997).
35. See generallyRosen, supra note 20. Indeed, even individuals who believe homosexuals
deserve equal respect and treatment under the law find the notion of same-sex marriage to be
bothersome. Id.Rosen writes, "many people who oppose gay marriage but support civil unions for
gays and lesbians say they don't believe that gays and lesbians deserve less respect than
heterosexuals but that there are differences between gay and straight unions that merit a semantic
distinction." Id.
36. See David B. Cruz, "JustDon't Call It Marriage":The FirstAmendment and Marriage
as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 925 (2001). Cruz discusses the public consternation
associated with the word "marriage" to define a same-sex union. See id. at 955-65. The article finds
heavy symbolic meaning with the word that should not so easily be replaced by less divisive
language, such as civil unions or domestic partnerships. See id at 996-1001.
37. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 185 (1999).
Rational argument on this issue will not resolve all controversy because it is very
likely that the resistance to full equality for gays has deep psychological roots.
Fear of the erosion of traditional distinctions and boundaries, fear of a type of
female sexuality that is unavailable to men, fear of a type of male sexuality that
is receptive rather than assertive - all these probably play a role in making the
current debate as ugly and irrational as it is.
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inclusion of same-sex couples into the institution of marriage,3" or the
danger of such inclusion.39 Few authors address the possibility of same-sex
civil unions as a way of advancing the rights of same-sex couples4" without
offending4" marriage traditionalists.42 When civil unions are addressed,
they are usually accepted as a bittersweet token of the public's hesitation
toward homosexuals.4 3 For example, the Vermont law allowing civil
unions is celebrated only briefly before it is decried as too little a step
toward equality," or worse, an affront to the dignity of homosexuals.
By arguing for the need to take a step toward parity now rather than
wait for full parity," we hope to bridge the gap between idealists and
matrimonial conservatives." Our argument will not be very convincing to
those who are interested only in the symbolic victory that same-sex
marriage would represent.47 Civil unions make sense because rights are

38. See generallyNishimoto, supra note 33; Cruz, supra note 36.
39. See generally William C. Duncan, Whither Marriagein the Law?, 15 REGENT U. L. REV.
119(2003).
40. See generallyRichard Goldstein, The Radical Casefor Gay Marriage(Sept. 3-9, 2003),
availableat http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0336/goldstein.php (last visited May 25, 2004).
While Goldstein argues that same-sex couples should have the right to marry, he acknowledges that
rights associated with marriage are of equal, if not greater, importance. See id. Kathleen Pollit, a
writer for The Nation, is quoted to support the author's conclusion: "Even as we support legalizing
same-sex unions ... we might ask whether we want to distribute these rights and privileges
according to marital status. Why should access to health care be a by-product of a legalized sexual
connection, gay or straight?" Id. The rights currently associated with marriage should be available
to all relationships, with or without the title of marriage. See id.
41. The only good reason for refraining from offending marriage traditionalists is that they
often represent the constituency that will likely keep same-sex marriage illegal. To compromise
with that constituency is to remove an important roadblock to attaining equal rights.
42. But see Linda S. Eckols, The Marriage Mirage: The Personal and Social Identity
ImplicationsofSame-GenderMatrimony, 5 MICH. J.GENDER& L. 353,353-59 (1999) (The author
goes out of her way to seek compromise and actively seeks the middle ground, all the while slowly
prodding towards the acceptance of same-sex marriage.).
43. See generally Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage:An Essay on Vermont's Civil
Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage,andSeparateBut (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113 (2000).
44. See id. at 136.
45. See Jocelyn J.Osofsky, Baker v. State: Is America Moving TowardsAllowing Same-Sex
Marriages?,3 J.L. & Fain. Stud. 79, 85 (2001) (tacitly accepting an incremental approach to the
expansion of civil rights).
46. See Eckols, supra note 42.
47. See generally Cruz, supra note 36. If civil marriage is an expressive resource, the
symbolic title "marriage" is an important right to be given to all couples as guaranteed by the First
Amendment. The mixed-sex marriage requirement could be seen as unconstitutional because it
limits the rights of expression for same-sex couples. To see civil marriage as expressive is to grant
that it is in some way an important cultural symbol.
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much easier to legislate than symbolic meanings.48 Who knows how long
the fight for symbolic equality for same-sex couples will take? In the mean
time, civil unions could guarantee equal rights for all couples, regardless
of sexual orientation.
II. THE

DEFINITIONAL NATURE OF THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE

And that'sreally where the issue is headedhere in Washington, and
that is the definition of marriage.I believe marriage is between a
man anda woman, andI believe we ought to codify that one way or
the other and we have lawyers looking at the best way to do that.
President George W. Bush49
The most popular arguments against same-sex marriage are not pieced
together to form the whole of the opposition. Rather, they are woven. Each
portion of the discourse is subtly connected to most of the other portions.
Arguments from biological grounds reference arguments from natural
law,5" which in turn refer to religion."1 The religious arguments52 are

48. It is impossible to legislate attitudes; all symbolic victories come through the changing
attitudes of the public. Attitudes are decidedly outside the realm of the judicial system.
49. See Lewis, supra note 25, at Al (emphasis added). On July 30, 2003, President George
W. Bush held a press conference in which he responded to a general question about homosexuality
by discussing the issue of same-sex marriage. The President made it clear that he intended to ensure
that the word "marriage" does not come to include same-sex unions. Id.
50. See, e.g., JamesQ. Wilson, AgainstHomosexualMarriage,in SAME-SEXMARRIAGE:THE
MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 141-42 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997).
51. It is not the intention of this Article to address arguments based upon biology, natural
law, or religion, but rather to focus on the extent to which their opposition rests primarily upon
semantic grounds. The reader should note the themes of biology, natural law, teleology, and
religion that appear in the case law to follow. See discussion, infra Part II.A and accompanying
notes.
52. See, e.g., Cal Thomas, Marriagefrom God, Not Courts, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE
MoRAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 42 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997).
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steeped in teleology,53 which refer back to biology.54 When a stance on any
issue is comprised of such interlocking parts, it stands to reason that there
is some part of the argument that is common to all elements. Further, it
would make sense for those who wish to overcome such an argument to
find the common part and diffuse it, thus unraveling the opposition.
As such, there is a common element to the standard and popular
arguments opposing same-sex marriage. A review of the case law will
show that a majority of the legal and philosophical antagonism to samesex marriage lies in a semantic struggle over the word "marriage.""
Consequently, same-sex civil unions could represent a viable way for
proponents of gay marriage to secure the rights associated with the
institution without encroaching on a fiercely guarded word. 6 It would
follow that calling same-sex marriage something else removes a
substantial obstacle to parity.57
Before considering the evidence in anti-gay-marriage arguments that
the debate is largely semantic, a caveat is in order. There are numerous
counters to the arguments we will consider. Reasons to be critical of gaymarriage prohibitionists abound in an already ample literature. 8 It is not

53. See, e.g., CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, CONSIDERATIONS
REGARDING PROPOSALS TO GIVE LEGAL RECOGNITION TO UNIONS BETWEEN HOMOSExuAL
(2003). This Vatican decree against same-sex marriage is important in that so many
people look to their church for moral and legal guidance on such issues, the Catholic Church often
wields great influence. Id.
54. See, e.g., Marriage'sTrue Ends, COMMONWEAL, May 17, 1996, at 5, availableat 1996
WL 11122616 ("Historically, marriage forged a powerful connection between sexual love,
procreation, and the care of children.").
55. See DONALD N. LEVINE, TlE FLIGHT FROM AMBIGUITY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL THEORY 42 (1985). What is marriage? Until the recent possibility of same-sex marriage
in the United States, the legal definition of marriage remained ambiguous, as if the concept were
obvious. DOMA, and other similar laws, now strictly define the legal concept of marriage. Id.
However, there are benefits to ambiguity. Id. The ambiguity of legal terms permits the infusion of
new concepts, which allows the law to adapt to a continually changing legal environment. Id.
56. See Elizabeth Bumiller, Cold Feet: Why America Has Gay MarriageJitters,N.Y. TmES,
Aug. 10, 2003, at 1. The article quotes Andrew J. Cherlin, professor of public policy at Johns
Hopkins University, as arguing: "For the average American, civil unions sound like tolerance, but
marriage sounds like approval." Id.Approval ofmarriage would be counter to the traditional notion
of marriage held by most Americans, as Norval D. Gleen, a professor of sociology at the University
of Texas, notes, "[Americans are] more traditional in how we define marriage in this country than
is the case in most of the Western world." Id. Bumiller quotes William Schneider, a CNN
commentator and longtime public opinion analyst, to sum up the point of her article, "Look, if you
don't call it marriage, you'll get more support." Id.
57. Contra NUSSBAUM, supra note 37, at 186.
58. See, e.g., MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE (Lynn D. Wardle et al. eds.,
2003).
PERSONS
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our purpose here to join in that debate; rather, we wish to approach it from
another angle. Whether the arguments impeding same-sex marriage are
sound or not,59 they are currently quite successful.6 ° Put another way, to
show where marriage prohibition arguments fail has not proven to reduce
their power in legal reasoning. 6' If reason does not work as an antidote to
same-sex marriage prohibition, perhaps sidestepping the entire
62 semantic
struggle will succeed in securing rights for same-sex couples.
In the courts, 63 same-sex marriage has been denied on definitional
grounds and on the grounds that marriage is fundamentally linked to
procreation.64 Interwoven in these reasons for prohibition are denials of an
analogy to antimiscegenation statutes, 65 religious prohibitions, and appeals
59. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 37, at 185; see also JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF
WOMEN 1-2 (Susan Moller Okin ed. 1988).

So long as an opinion is strongly rooted in the feelings, it gains rather than loses
in stability by having a preponderating weight of argument against it ... [T]he
worse it fares in argumentative contest, the more persuaded its adherents are that
their feeling must have some deeper ground, which the arguments do not reach;
and while the feeling remains, it is always throwing up fresh entrenchment's of
argument to repair any breach made in the old.
Id.

60. The arguments are successful in that they appeal to widespread public opinion and
traditional notions of marriage.
61. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 37, at 185.

62. Other approaches to sidestepping same-sex marriage prohibition have argued that
marriage is not created by the state but passively recognized by it. The ramifications of such a view
might include a hands-offapproach by all arms of the government in terms of defining who can and
cannot be married. See, e.g., Teresa Stanton Collett, Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage:Askingfor
the Impossible?, 47 CATH. U.L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1998). Collett observes, "Marriage is a reality

created by the commitment and actions of the couple. State involvement with marriage arises not
because it is the source of the marital relationship, but because it encounters the reality of that
relationship in the lives of its citizens." Id.
63. In Jones v.Hallahan,the Jones court relied upon definitions of the word marriage. Jones
v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). In Baker v. Nelson, the Baker court relied
upon the common usage of the word to deny same-sex couples the right to marry. Baker v. Nelson,
191 N.W.2d 185, 185-86 (Minn. 1971). For further discussion, see infra Part II.A and
accompanying notes.
64. See generallySkinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Even though this case is about
criminal sterilization and not same-sex marriage, it is relevant because it is often cited as evidence
that the court recognizes the importance of procreation to the institution of marriage.
65. In Loving v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court established the right to marry as a
fundamental right protected under the Constitution and invalidated Virginia's miscegenation
statute. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). Chief Justice Warren opined, "Marriage is one
of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." Id. at 12 (citing
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
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to "natural law."' What all of these argumentative approaches share is
their crux: the definition of the word marriage. The following review of
the cases substantiates our claim that same-sex marriage resistance is
largely semantic.
A. Evidence in the Case Law
The popular and substantive objections to same-sex marriage are
semantic.67 In other words, much of the opposition to same-sex marriage
rests with a fierce resistance to any change in the "traditional"6 definition
of marriage.69 Marriage must remain a bond between one man and one
woman,70 lest the institution of marriage lose its meaning.7 ' The driving
force behind the continuing legal prohibition of same-sex marriage is the
argument that to preserve the traditional meaning of marriage, 72 same-sex
66. See Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, in MARRIAGE AND
SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE 97 (Lynn D. Wardle et. al. eds., 2003).
67. See Bumiller, supra note 56, at 1.
68. RELIGION AND SOCIETY REPORT, Same Sex Marriageis Not Marriage,in GAY MARRIAGE
87 (Tamara L. Roleffed., 1998). "Marriage is, and always has been.... a union between male and
female." Id. at 88.
69. Robert H. Knight, Same-Sex MarriageShould Not Be Legal, in GAY MARRIAGE 58
(Tamara L. Roleff ed., 1998). "Marriage as traditionally defined - the union of one man and one
woman - is the most important social institution around the world. Legalizing same-sex marriage
would turn the state against those who believe in the traditional definition of marriage." Id.
70. The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on HR 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996) (statement of Hadley
Arkes, the Ney Professor of Jurisprudence at Amherst College and contributing editor of the
National Review). Professor Arkes stated:
[T]he notion of marriage may not be altered to fit marriage di solo [alone] without
altering the defining logic of marriage. And in the same way, I would suggest that
the notion of marriage could not be stretched to encompass people of the same sex
without altering out of shape the definition that represents the coherence and
meaning of marriage.
Id.
71. If marriage were to include same-sex couples, traditionalists argue, then the very essence
of marriage would be changed in a harmful way. See, e.g., The Ramsey Colloquium, The
Homosexual Movement: A Response by the Ramsey Colloquium, FIRST THINGS: A MONTHLY J. OF
RELIGION & PuB. LIFE, Mar. 1994, at 19. "[M]arriage and the family... are fragile institutions in
need of careful and continuing support." Id.
72. See Marriage's True Ends, supra note 54. "Historically, marriage forged a powerful
connection between sexual love, procreation, and the care of children .... Legalizing same-sex
unions will not remedy a self-evident injustice by broadening access to the traditional goods of
marriage." Id.The editorial continues to argue that, "same-sex marriage, like polygamy, would
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couples must be denied the right to marry." In the cases that we consider,
denials of same-sex marriage flow from a court's adherence to the
traditional definition of marriage.74 The cases are addressed in
chronological order.
1. Baker v. Nelson
A same-sex couple seeking a marriage license appealed their denial to
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in 1971. The lower court not only ruled
that the Clerk of Courts was not required to issue a marriage license to
Richard John Baker and James Michael McConnell, but it further directed
the clerk not to issue the license."
The relevant portion of the decision was not on arguments claiming
that the lower court offended the First,76 Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution." Rather, the relevant portion of the
decision concerned Minnesota's marriage statute itself. The plaintiff,
Richard Baker argued that lacking an "express statutory prohibition
against same-sex marriages" the marriage statute allows for such unions.
The assertion was rejected on purely definitional grounds.
The decision went no further than Webster's Dictionary and Black's
Law Dictionary to deny the statutory possibility of same-sex marriage. The
Court held that common usage,7" Webster's Dictionary,79 and Black's Law
change the very nature and social architecture of marriage in ways that may empty it of any
distinctive meaning." Id.
73. See Kohm, supra note 26, at 115. Allowing alternative versions of marriage and
marriage-like institutions downgrades the importance of marriage as it stands in our culture. Id.
74. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61 (Haw. 1993). The Hawaiian Department of
Health argued from a definitional standpoint that same-sex marriage was impermissible; "the right
of persons of the same sex to marry one another does not exist because marriage, by definition and
usage, means a special relationship between a man and a woman." Id.
75. See generally Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
76. See Cruz, supra note 36, at 965-70.
77. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Supreme Court held
that a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id.at 485-86. The Court said that marriage was a "noble" and
"sacred" relationship, into whose privacy the state could not intrude without compelling cause. Id.
at 486.
78. See Richard D. Mohr, The Casefor Gay Marriage,9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcS & PUB.
POL'Y 215, 219 (1995).
Most commonly, dictionaries define marriage in terms of spouses, spouses in
terms of husband and wife, and husband and wife in terms of marriage. In
consequence, the various definitions do no work in explaining what marriage is
and so simply end up assuming or stipulating that marriage must be between
people of different sexes.
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Dictionary,8" agreed that marriage is by definition between one man and
one woman. Consequently, the Baker court concluded that the marriage
statute did not allow same-sex marriage. 8'
Once the semantic denial was in place, the Baker court denied all of the
constitutional arguments, some without discussion. This theme will be
repeated in other subsequent cases. There was no reason to consider
constitutional arguments when the petitioners lack the definitional
requirements of marriage.
2. Jones v. Hallahan
In a decision strikingly similar to Baker v. Nelson, the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky, two years later, upheld the denial of a marriage license by the
Jefferson County Clerk of Courts to Marjorie Jones and her partner.82
While the Baker court heard constitutional arguments before dismissing
them, Judge Vance refused in this case. The Kentucky decision addressed
only the definitional inability of Jones and her partner to enter into a
marriage. Because Kentucky's marriage laws lack a definition of the term,
Webster's and Black's dictionaries were again referenced, as well as
common usage.83 Judge Vance wrote, "It appears to us that appellants are
prevented from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal of
the County Court Clerk of Jefferson County to issue them a license, but
rather by their own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is
defined."84
The Jones court's reasoning was as brief as it was simple: Jefferson
County could legally deny two women a marriage license because "the
resulting relationship would not constitute a marriage."85 The Jones court
did not consider whether the denial was an offense to the women's free
exercise of religion or if the women were being punished unfairly; these

Id.
79. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 713 (10th ed. 1993).
80. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123-1124 (4th ed. 1951).

81. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
82. See generally Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
83. Intellectual backing for a reliance on common usage as a determiner of definition can be
found in KErrH ALLAN, LINGUISTIC MEANING 78, vol. 1 (1986). "[Tlhe meaning of a word is
governed by its use." However, if people begin to refer to civil unions or domestic partnerships in
everyday language as "marriages" then the definition of marriage, in other words its common
usage, will also have changed. Thus, the meaning of marriage, per se, is grounded in its daily use
and acceptance.
84. See Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589.
85. Id.
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issues did not matter because the women sought a statutory impossibility.
With a semantic denial to same-sex marriage in place, the Jones court
found that there was no need to consider civil rights arguments.
3. Singer v. Hara
Many proponents of same-sex marriage rely on an analogy to
antimiscegenation laws. 6 In light of these laws, 7 and their injustice,88 the
injustice in prohibiting men to marry men and women to marry women
should be clear.8 9 In Singer v. Hara,90 the plaintiff cited Loving v.
Virginia,9 the landmark interracial marriage case and Perez v. Lippold92
a similar California case, to analogize prohibitions on same-sex marriage
to antimiscegenation laws. 93

86. See Stephen Clark, Same-Sex but Equal: Reformulating the MiscegenationAnalogy, 34
RUTGERS

L. J. 107, 160-85 (2002).

87. See James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex MarriageandtheMiscegenation

Analogy, 73 B.U.L. REV. 93, 94 (1993). Another important similarity between same-sex marriage
and interracial marriage is the impediment to progress caused by less-than-impartial judges. Much
as discrimination was pandemic in the courts of the 1950s and 60s, today's courts could contain
"judicial ignorance, prejudice, and hostility" toward gay men and women. Id.
88. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 37, at 201.
89. The analogy is strongest when applied as follows: supporters of interracial marriage
fought antimiscegenation laws by stating that the law prohibits someone from getting married based
solely on his or her race. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Wash. App. 1974). The
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits such discrimination. Id. When a man is denied the right to marry
another man, the grounds for the denial are based on his gender; if he were a woman, the
prohibition would not exist. Id. at 1191-92. Therefore, the hallmark interracial marriage case,
Loving v. Virginia, should be considered precedent supporting same-sex marriage. See generally
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); contra William C. Duncan, The Mere Allusion to Gender:
Answering the Charge that Marriage is Sex Discrimination,46 ST. Louis L.J. 963 (2002). The
author asserts that the anti-miscegenation analogy is unfair:
The argument is simple: marriage laws may treat men and women equally, but
defenders ofmiscegenation statutes said that those laws treated both races equally.
The distinction between sex and race is thus ignored by the court, though other
courts have noted that Loving primarily regards race discrimination and so is not
appropriate to the discussion of same-sex marriage.
Id. at 970.
90. See generallySinger, 522 P.2d at 1187.

91. Id.; Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
92. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
93. For further discussion on the miscegenation analogy, see Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W. 2d
588 (Ky. App. 1973); Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the
Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFoLK U. L. REv. 981 (1991).
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Not surprisingly, the Singer court disagreed with John F. Singer's
analogy on semantic grounds. While Richard Loving was denied legal
marriage on the basis of a suspect race classification, "no analogous sexual
classification"94 was found in Singer. The decision states that legal history
finds the definition of marriage so obvious that it barely needs mentioning.
The Singer court cited Jones v. Hallahan, relying on its definition of
marriage, a union between a man and a woman, to exclude same-sex
marriages from the term. The plaintiff s analogy to antimiscegenation laws
failed because the Singer court found that there could be no unfair sex
classification since the union of two same-sex people could never fall
within the definition of marriage.95
4. Adams v. Howerton
Adams v. Howerton,96 was brought after an Australian citizen, Anthony
Sullivan, actually obtained a marriage license in Colorado with his partner,
Richard Adams. Sullivan's visa expired and he sought immediate relative
status with Adams so that he could stay in the United States. To deny
immediate relative status to Sullivan in the days before DOMA, the
California court relied on the traditional definition of marriage as a reason
not to recognize the Colorado marriage license. Amid rhetoric about
religious canons and procreation, the Adams decision clearly stated,
"[T]hus there has been for centuries a combination of scriptural and
canonical teaching under which a 'marriage' between persons of the same
sex was unthinkable,97 and by definition, impossible."98 Proponents of
same-sex marriage may be able to tangle with the moral judgment,
"unthinkable," but "impossible" is a much more damning label.
This case shows that even securing a license cannot stop the power that
the definition of marriage has over the courts. Even before DOMA put the
semantics into law, the meaning of marriage was invoked to deny samesex matrimony.

94. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Wash. App. 1974).
95. See contra Edward Stein, Evaluatingthe Sex DiscriminationArgumentfor Lesbian and
Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 474 (2001) ("[Tlhis argument does not offer a strong legal
strategy for obtaining lesbian and gay rights and that it should be used with caution.").
96. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
97. Should logical interpretations of acceptable and unacceptable relationships be affirmed
via semantic arguments? For a rather lofty method of visualizing the relationship between
semantics and logic, see generally RONALD SCHLEIFER, A.J. GREIMAS AND THE NATURE OF
MEANING: LINGUISTICS, SEMIOTICS AND DISCOURSE THEORY xxii (1987).
98. See Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1123.
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5. De Santo v. Barnsley
In 1981, John De Santo filed for divorce from William Barnsley.99 This
case exposes a novel facet to the argument over same-sex marriage. De
Santo claimed that he and Barnsley had a common-law marriage of eleven
years, and as such, he was entitled to the customary entitlements of
divorce. In an ironic twist, Barnsley, a man who had participated in a
uniting ceremony before friends, argued that he and De Santo were not
married because they were incapable of the legal relationship. The De
Santo court relied on the traditional definition of marriage to inform the
common-law definition of marriage.100 The De Santo court held that
DeSanto and Barnsley could not by definition be married and therefore
could not divorce. 101
6. Dean v. Districtof Columbia
Most recently and most succinctly, Dean v. Districtof Columbia0 2 in
1995 illustrates that the prohibition against same-sex marriage hinges on
a definition. Craig Dean and his partner, Robert Gill, sued to obtain a
marriage license in the District of Columbia. When the lower court denied
their request, they appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
In a per curiam opinion, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
Judge Terry's concurring opinion began by stating, "[tihe outcome of this
case, in my view, turns on the definition of 'marriage."' ' 3 This lengthy
decision, which considered the widest array of issues at hand, declared in
the first sentence that the definition was the determining factor.
Additionally, Judge Terry asserted that marriage as a legal status "refers
only to the mutual relationship between a man and a woman as husband

99. De Santo v. Bamsley, 476 A.2d. 952 (Pa. Super. Ct 1984).
100. For an excellent discussion on the dangers of relying upon tradition as a source of rights,
see generally Adam B. Wolf, FundamentallyFlawed: Tradition and FundamentalRights, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 101 (2002). Reliance on tradition is not helpful to minorities in general because, "in
a nation in which subjugation has been more the norm than the exception, relying on tradition often
legitimizes and perpetuates prior discrimination." Id. at 102.
101. One of the benefits or rights afforded to married couples is economic security. If a
married couple decides to divorce, both parties have certain economic or financial rights. However,
a same-sex couple does not have such rights in the event of a separation. See Elizabeth M. Dolan
& Marlene S. Stum, Economic Security and FinancialManagement Issues Facing Same-Sex
Couples, in THE GAY & LESBIAN MARRIAGE & FAMILY READER 1-24 (Jennifer M. Lehmann ed.,

2001).
102. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (1995).
103. Id. at 308 (Terry, J., concurring).
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and wife, and therefore that same-sex 'marriages' are legally and factually
i.e., definitionally'0 4 - impossible."1 05
Dean, much more so than any of the cases discussed above, went
beyond the semantic debate. 06 To be sure, the first and foremost argument
in the decision hinged on statutory definition of marriage as a different-sex
institution. However, the Court did address anti-sex discrimination law,
human rights claims, and constitutional issues. 107 Thus the semantic nature
of same-sex marriage prohibition is made very clear by this opinion.
B. The Casefor Civil Unions
One may find it surprising how little of the prohibition against samesex marriage rests on non-semantic reasoning. When the courts are made
to defend the refusal of marriage licenses to same-sex couples, they go
first to dictionaries.'0 8 That the legal definition of marriage on the federal
and many state levels is between one man and one woman means that the
current fight for same-sex marriage is an underdog at best.
The simplest reason that civil unions make sense is that they
completely avoid using the word "marriage."'0 9 If gay and lesbian civil
104. See ALEXANDER MATHEWS, A DIAGRAM OF DEFINITION: THE DEFINING OF DEFINITION
5 (1998). Whether something is definitionally possible is often a reference to how a word or
concept is conventionally understood. In the beginning of a definition's use, an arbitrary choice is
made as to how a certain word will be described. Due to some common interest that particular
alternative is perpetuated. That a particular definition has been perpetuated is no proof of its
ultimate truth, only of its favor by "common interest." Id. If marriage as one man and one woman
has been perpetuated because of some long-standing "common interest," it might make sense for
same-sex couples to seek a less conventionally understood title for their unions. Id.
105. See Dean,653 A.2d at 361 (Terry, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Judge Terry
also wrote, "if it is impossible for two persons of the same sex to 'marry,' then surely no court can
say that a refusal to allow same-sex couples to 'marry' could ever be a denial of equal protection."
Id.
106. See generally Heather Hodges, Dean v. The Districtof Columbia: Goin'tothe Chapel
and We're Gonna Get Married,5 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 93, 144 (1996). "The ruling in Dean is
a key decision in the movement to obtain same-sex marriage rights because it demonstrates that
even after the decision in Bowers, a low blow to the gay and lesbian rights movement, same-sex
couples may not obtain marriage rights even outside the privacy doctrine." Id.
107. For a typical example of the denial of constitutional claims for same-sex marriage, see
generally Kevin Aloysius Zambrowicz, "To Love and Honor all the Days of Your Life": A
ConstitutionalRight to Same-Sex Marriage?,43 CATH. U. L. REV. 907 (1994).
108. See DUPUIS, supra note 11. The definitional approach has a sterilizing effect on the
arguments. Writers of opinions are able to claim that their decisions come not from homophobia
or anti-gay bias, but rather from a clean, crisp definition.
109. The popular tendency to cling to the word "marriage" in its traditional sense might be
explained by Luanne C. Lea, Words and Things - The Naming Game, 49 ETC: A REVIEW OF
GENERAL SEMANTICS 297, 298 (1992). "[N]o matter what we call any thing, that label is
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rights leaders advocate civil unions, the opposition can never retort that
"marriage is between a man and a woman." The fiercely guarded
definition of marriage would become irrelevant to the question of granting
rights to same-sex couples. Same-sex couples could seek marital rights
without offending the definition of marriage that is so important to
traditionalists."'
A recent example of the ferocity with which traditionalists guard the
word marriage is the Massachusetts Supreme Court case Goodridge v.
DepartmentofPublicHealth."' In Goodridge,the court's decision ignored
civil unions and focused on the constitutional question of same-sex
marriage, holding that the common law definition of marriage did not
include same-sex couples. Soon after the Goodridgecourt issued its ruling,
a backlash appeared in the form of support for a state constitutional
amendment." 2 Proposed amendments at state and federal levels again
relied on definitional prohibitions of same-sex marriage." 3
More interestingly, as the opposition to same-sex marriage becomes
more complex, it becomes less relevant to civil unions." 4 There is no such
thing as the historic institution of civil unions, steeped for centuries in

responding to some bit of truth about the world. Whatever that truth is, its reality continues to exist
before, after, and apart from our efforts to contain it with language." Id.
110. See infra Part III.A (explaining why the symbolic title is important, but not appropriate
for this argument).
111. See generally Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). In
November of 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled in a 4-3 decision that "[t]he marriage
ban works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment of the community for no rational
reason." Id. at 968. The Goodridge court granted the state legislature 180 days to change the state
law regarding marriages to allow for same-sex marriages. Id.at 970. This case is significantly
different from the Vermont decision in that the result appears to be actual marriage, in name and
rights, and not a civil union containing the rights of marriage without the title. See generallyBaker
v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
112. See A MassachusettsCourtStarts a National Debate that Poses Problemsfor Both the
Republicans and the Democrats, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 2003, at 29-30. The article cites the
strong backlash, which solidified the movement for a constitutional amendment to ban gay
marriage, as a reason "why some gay leaders have argued that civil unions offer a more pragmatic
solution." Id.
113. For an example of a proposed constitutional amendment, see Cooperman, supra note 21,
at A0 1.
114. See generally Dale M. Schowengerdt, Defending Marriage:A Litigation Strategy to
Oppose Same-Sex "Marriage," 14 REGENT U.L. REv. 487 (2001/2002) (warning that same-sex
marriage advocates are "chipping away" at the traditional institution of marriage). This article
offers a legal strategy for opposing same-sex marriage. Id. at 488. The author also claims that
"opponents" of same-sex marriage are not "opponents" at all, but rather "defenders" of traditional
marriage. Id. at 489. The use of civil unions to guarantee rights to same-sex couples would,
however, circumscribe such semantic opposition (or defense).
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natural law, tradition and custom." 5 The nascent quality about civil unions
guards it from arguments that claim the definition of matrimony is
historical. Concerns over the potential degradation of child-rearing
environments resulting from alterations to the traditional meaning of
marriage can be laid to rest." 6 The complex forms of the semantic
argument, outlined above, have little to say about civil unions. No one ever
claimed that the meaning behind a civil union has anything to do with
history, tradition, procreation, or sexual differentiation. With such
insulation from the explicit arguments against same-sex marriage, civil
unions stand a chance at granting same-sex couples legal equality." 7

115. See John C. Green, Antigay: Varieties of Opposition to Gay Rights, in THE POLITICS OF
GAY RIGHTS 121, 122 (Craig A. Rimmerman et al. eds., 2000).
Of course, "tradition" is a problematic notion in the United States, given the
country's modem cast, intense individualism, great diversity, and dynamic nature.
But precisely because of the unsettled character of American society, social
stability and conventional arrangements are often prized and strenuously
defended. If accepted for long enough and bolstered by the substantive values of
enough people, such arrangements can take on the patina of "tradition," even
though they may not be especially old.
Id; see generally ROBERT H. WmBE, THE SEGMENTED SOCIETY (1975).
116. However, it should be noted that three to four million gay and lesbian parents are
estimated to be rearing between six and fourteen million children. Angela Bolte, Do Wedding
Dresses Come in Lavender? The Prospectsand Implicationsof Same-Sex Marriage,in THE GAY
& LESBIAN MARRIAGE & FAMILY READER 27 (Jennifer M. Lehmann ed., 2001).

While traditional arguments claim that same-sex marriages should be banned
because the children within those families will be subject to harm both through
ridicule and confusion over sexual roles, it is rather the case that children are
directly harmed through the banning of same-sex marriages. Currently, when a
same-sex relationship ends, no institutions are in place to ensure the protection of
the children, as there are when traditional marriages dissolve.
Id. Civil unions could offer similar protection to children raised by gay or lesbian parents.
117. See generally Greg Johnson, In Praiseof Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 315 (2002).
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THE COUNTERARGUMENTS TO CIVIL UNIONS

It's importantnot to let the perfect be the enemy of the good..
- Hillary Clinton

S

Many of the loudest opponents of civil unions for same-sex couples are
proponents of parity between same-sex and different-sex couples." 9
Unfortunately, there is a debate within the gay and lesbian community
concerning the appropriateness of same-sex civil unions. This internal
debate works against a unified movement towards establishing legal
parity; it is not "us against them," but rather "us against us." Similar
struggles are found within many minority communities. Because
establishing parity is so important to so many
people, disagreements
120
within a disadvantaged group are unfortunate.
Nonetheless, it is hoped that by defusing some of the arguments against
civil unions, it can be shown that it is reasonable to advocate same-sex
civil unions, at least in the short term. The strongest counterarguments to
same-sex civil unions come in two main forms. One is that same-sex civil
unions harm the movement toward parity by acquiescing to unequal
treatment between same-sex and different-sex couples. Civil unions are not
marriage, the argument goes, so they separate same-sex couples from what
is considered acceptable, thereby causing same-sex couples to sacrifice
their dignity. Similarly, the second objection is that same-sex civil unions
harm the movement toward equality, but it is characterized in terms of
harming progress. The objection states that incremental steps toward parity
tend to drain strength from the movement. The two objections are similar
because they agree that the movement toward parity should be protected.
However, the two counterarguments are different enough to warrant
separate attention.

118. David Kirby, Hillary: Up Close and Personal,THE ADVOCATE, Oct. 2000, at 38, 44.
119. See generallyCox, supranote 43; James M. Donovan, Baby Steps or One FellSwoop?:
The IncrementalExtension ofRights Is Not a DefensibleStrategy, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 1,2-4 (2001);
see supra NUSSBAUM, note 37.
120. Strong divisions within African American equality movements are especially pronounced
in the United States. These historical divisions are analogous to the "us against us" division within
the movement for same-sex marriage. Compare generally W.E.B. Du BoiS, THE SOULS OF BLACK
FoLK (Penguin Books 1989) (1903), with BOOKERT. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY (Doubleday
1998) (1901).
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A. The FirstCounterargumentto Advocacy of Civil Unions
The first counterargument to advocating for civil unions appeals to
dignity of same-sex couples and relies on the premise that separate rules
for different people are rarely just.' Proponents of this counterargument
state accepting civil unions is an unappropriate compromise.' For these
critics, full equality is right and just,'23 and to accept anything less than
marital parity from our government is tantamount to accepting separate but
unequal treatment.'24 For them, accepting civil unions would
"compromise" their integrity.
Proponents of this argument usually draw an analogy to Brown v.
Boardof Education. 2' They use this analogy as an appeal to dignity. They
reason that by accepting anything less than parity is to lend legitimacy to
injustice. By this argument, it is an insult to dignity to submit to injustice
in the name of expediency, even when the compromise would
afford far
26
1
enjoy.
currently
they
than
couples
same-sex
to
more rights
This counterargument can be separated into two concerns: 1) civil
unions are tantamount to separate but unequal treatment; and 2) accepting
anything less than full parity is a sacrifice of human dignity. In response
to the first concern, the analogy between civil unions and racial
121. Indeed, a failure to find a compelling state interest for sex-based discrimination lead the
Hawaiian court to allow same-sex marriage. See generally, Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394,
1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
122. See, e.g., Bolte, supranote 116, at 42. "Ifdomestic partnerships [defined similarly to civil
unions in this context] are expanded, these partnerships could be viewed as 'separate but equal' to

marriages between opposite-sex couples. As the civil rights movement illustrates, such situations
are very rarely equal." Id.
123. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay PeopleShould Seek the Right to Marry, in LESBIAN
AND GAY MARRIAGE

16-18 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992).

124. See generally Cooperman, supra note 21; see also Clark, supra note 86, at 107.

125. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Michael Mello, For Today, I'm Gay: The
UnfinishedBattlefor Same-Sex Marriagein Vermont, 25 VT. L. REV. 149, 242 (2000).

Vermont's separate but equal system of marriage ought to be held unconstitutional
for precisely the same reason that Brown v.Board of Educationheld separate but
equal public schools unconstitutional and for the same reason the post-Brown
cases held separate but equal buses, swimming pools, golf courses and libraries
unconstitutional. Such legally-mandated segregation marks the segregated with
an unmistakable badge of inferiority.
Id.

126. A more radical approach to dissolve the inequality between opposite and same-sex
couples is the abolition of all marital rights. See generally Summer L. Nastich, Questioningthe
MarriageAssumptions: The Justificationsfor "Opposite-Sex Only" Marriageas Supportfor the
Abolition ofMarriage, 21 LAW & INEQ. 114 (2003).
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segregation is somewhat dubious at face value. 12' The injustices put forth
by Plessy v. Ferguson128 and Jim Crowe laws were, in spirit and letter,
restrictive legislation. They outlined activities that African Americans
could not do and places they could not be. Civil unions, on the other hand,
are expansive, not restrictive. Same-sex couples are not being actively
stripped of anything when civil union laws are enacted. On the contrary,
they would be given rights they once did not have. Because of the
expansive nature of civil union legislation, it is inappropriate to compare
a step forward in rights with institutionalized racism.
Further, the rights extended to same-sex couples via civil unions would
be identical to the rights of marriage. Civil unions would establish legal
equality and so are not a relegation in every sense of the word. Of course,
there is a separation when same-sex couples are forced to call their unions
something other than marriage, but civil unions grant rights to same-sex
couples that they otherwise would not have.'29 In short, when the
circumstances are not ideal, a civil union is a rose by another name. 3°
Non-ideal circumstances should be kept in mind as we consider the
second concern. This concern engages in an incomplete solution fallacy.' 3
127. See, e.g., ESKRiDGE, supra note 11, at 134-35.
There is a disturbing parallel between the civil unions law and the segregation of
railroad cars upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson.Just as
Louisiana a century ago gave blacks and whites separate and (assertedly) equal
railroad cars, so Vermont now gives gays and straights separate and (assertedly)
equal legal forms for their committed relationships .... In each case the minority
objected that separation, viewed in its social context, symbolically reflected and
deepened a functional inequality - whose relevance the state denied.
Id.
128. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Often a parallel is made between
the "separate but equal" legislation in Plessy v. Ferguson and the civil union laws granting
"separate but equal" status to same-sex couples.
129. See Johnson, supra note 117, at 315.
130. See Craig A. Sloane, A Rose by Any Other Name: Marriageand the DanishRegistered
PartnershipAct, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 189, 189-202 (1997).
131. See BROWNE&KEELEY, supra note 28, at 103-04.
Just because part of a problem would remain after a solution is tried does not mean
the solution is unwise. A partial solution may be vastly superior to no solution at
all; it may make a contribution to solving the problem. It may move us a step
closer to. solving the problem completely. If we waited for perfect solutions to
emerge, we would often find ourselves paralyzed, unable to act. A partial solution
may be the best we can find.
Id. at 104.
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That a solution is not ideal is not grounds to dismiss it entirely. If the
social environment is not supportive of full equality, it is unreasonable to
dismiss a solution because it falls short of perfection. Admittedly, civil
unions are not full parity in the symbolic sense, but if full parity is perforce
unlikely in the short term, the best chance for some equality should be
sought a fortiori.'32 As Senator Hillary Clinton put it, opposing civil unions
because they are not marriage would be allowing the perfect to be an
enemy of the good.'33 If the semantic resistance to same-sex marriage
proves insurmountable, it would behoove same-sex marriage advocates to
resist vilifying same-sex civil unions just because they are not everything
advocates of parity want.
Moreover, incomplete solutions are successful in other areas of
everyday life. For instance, an ideal solution to environmental degradation
would be a simultaneous move toward cleaner energy sources and an
attitude of conservation among the public. In that such moves are unlikely,
we gladly accept a gradual move toward clean energy and economic
incentives for conservation. That our current solution to environmental
problems is not perfect is no reason to discount it as unfit. Similarly, in a
country where pundits from most of the ideological spectrum take a
prohibitory stance to same-sex marriage, an incomplete solution is
perfectly reasonable.' 34
Identifying an incomplete solution fallacy in the argument based on a
lack of equality against civil unions does not escape the opposition focused
on dignity, however. In response to the criticism that suggests a sacrifice
of dignity for same-sex couples is inherent in civil union legislation, we
can only point out that the law is limited. Public opinion cannot be
legislated. The institution of marriage cannot easily be separated from
historically strong religious sentiment. Legislation cannot make

132. See Eckols, supra note 42, at 357.

I am concerned that moving too quickly on legalization of same-gender marriage
disregards the feelings of a large segment of the American population and puts
same-gender couples at risk. The more prudent and, perhaps, wiser course of
action is to acknowledge and accept the fears of opposite-gender couples, to
encourage reflective discourse, to increase gradually the visibility of same-gender
couples on a local, individual scale, and to foster support within the general
public. Then, when same-gender marriage is legalized, the backlash out of fear
and resentment will be minimized.
Id.
133. Kirby, supra note 118, at 38, 44.
134. See Bumiller, supra note 56, at 1.
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guarantee equal
homophobia disappear. What can be done is to legally
35
rights to same-sex couples to encourage equality.1
Finally, if marriage as a legal institution exists as 1) a set of rights, and
2) a symbolic recognition by society, civil unions make even more sense
in the short term. Currently, same-sex couples have neither of these
attributes of legal marriage (outside of Vermont, anyway). Civil unions
would at least grant one of marriage's attributes. If accepting only one of
marriage's attributes is an affront to dignity, then the only bigger affront
would be continuing with neither. Of course accepting "civil unions" feels
wrong to people who think they should be allowed to "marry." But,
allowing same-sex couples to be devoid of both the title AND rights of
marriage is all the more harmful.
B. The Second Counterargumentto Advocacy of Civil Unions
The second counterargument could be viewed as somewhat less lofty
than the first. Rather than appeals to human dignity, this counterargument
worries about the strength of the movement toward equality in a more
practical sense.' 36 Some argue that incremental steps and granting of
partial status drain momentum from civil rights movements. 13 In short:
small steps toward a goal ultimately slow progress, 31 ironically enough.
More broadly, this counterargument is wary of incremental steps toward
civil rights goals.
The authors hope to dispel this second counterargument by briefly
defending incrementalism and asserting that, rightly or wrongly, small
135. See Eckols, supranote 42, at 357. "I advocate for patience, understanding, and tolerance
on the part of same-gender couples so society as awhole can move closer to a consensus of support
and understanding rather than using our legal system as a weapon to force acceptance." Id.
136. See, e.g., Bolte, supra note 116, at42.
Gays and lesbians must not be taken in by possible benefits, but must examine all
the possibilities. There is a very real chance that domestic partnerships could be
used to sidestep justice issues regarding the treatment of gays and lesbians. If
domestic partnerships were granted, any request for the legalization of same-sex
marriage could be seen as unnecessary and selfish.
Id.
137. See generally Cox, supra note 43. Civil unions are a step in the right direction, yet they
remain separate and unequal from marriage. Furthermore, they create an atmosphere of
complacency which consequentially lessens the passionate push for total equality.
138. See Differing Paths,supra note 13, at 2009. "One explanation for this failure to carry
reform to completion may be that, having obtained many of the rights associated with marriage,
same-sex couples are not as motivated to advocate for marriage rights as they were when the rights
gap was greater." Id.
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steps are the way things tend to get accomplished in the United States. To
start, incrementalism is multifaceted. Certain kinds of incrementalism have
very valid opposition. For instance, "list incrementalism"' 39 like the kind
used in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) is not too
attractive from a civil rights standpoint. To be frank, a slowly expanding
list of those to whom we afford equality has substantial faults. Specifically
stating the groups that get equal 40treatment can add legitimacy to exclusion
of those not on the ENDA list.
This form of incrementalism is unfairly conflated with the acceptance
of same-sex civil unions. There is no slowly expanding list of those who
can marry. Marriage itself may not be a fundamental right in the same way
that employment non-discrimination is, but if the rights we give to
different-sex couples are condign 14' for same-sex couples as well, any step
toward the latter's inclusion would be just.
Incremental steps are, after all, a reality of a federalist system. Unlike
the European Union, 142 Scandinavia in particular, 143 civil rights progress
in the United States has historically happened in fits and starts rather than
bursts. 144 Additionally, the United States lacks the pressure from45
surrounding countries to be more accepting toward same-sex couples. 1
Scandinavian countries, however, seem to be in an arms race of sorts to
outdo one another in human rights. The result of our federalist system and
our lack of human rights encouragers from abroad is a harsh environment
for speedy change.
But what of the argument concerned with the momentum of the civil
rights movement? It seems that this argument has been dispelled by recent
events. On the coattails of Vermont's civil union statute, the movement for

139. See generally Donovan, supra note 119.
140. Id.
141. Contra Margaret F. Brinig & Lynn D. Wardle, United States: Deconstructing the
American Family- Developments in Family Law During1993,33 U. OF LOUISVILLE J.OFFAM. L.
541, 553 (1995). This article argues that parity is a detriment to the family: "Homosexual
relationships are the latest alternative lifestyle to mimic and claim parity with marital and parental
relations." Id.
142. See Edward Brumby, What Is in a Name: Why the EuropeanSame-sex PartnershipActs
Create a Valid MaritalRelationship,28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 145, 145-52 (1999).
143. See Sloane, supra note 130, at 189.
144. See, e.g., DUPUIS, supra note 11.
145. Only recently has Canada, which in 2003 allowed same-sex marriages, made the United
States look more closely at the possibility of same-sex marriage or civil unions. See Clifford
Krauss, Now Free to Marry, Canada'sGays Say, 'DoI? ',N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2003, at 1."How
marriage affects gay and lesbian life in Canada, and wider society, is an issue being closely
watched by gays in the United States, who see what is happening in Canada as a harbinger for
American society." Id.

2004]

CIVIL UNION STATUTES: A SHORTCUT TO LEGAL EQUALTY FOR SAME-SEXPARTNERS

257

same-sex marriage has not slowed. On the contrary, cases in
Massachusetts, 146 New Jersey, 4 7 and Indiana, 14 are challenging the

foundations of DOMA and working for marital parity.
Further, Vermont has shown that civil unions are now within legislative
possibility. 149 It is ironic that those who are worried about slowing down
the movement by compromising fail to see the speed with which civil
union legislation could be enacted relative to the snail's pace of the
progress in the fight for same-sex marriage, especially in states more
conservative than Massachusetts.

IV. CONCLUSION

Civil rights movements are doomed to proceed in stages, phases, fits,
and starts.150 When those on the vanguard of social movements see a goal
146. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
147. Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114 (N.J. Sup. Ct., Nov. 5, 2003).
On November 5, 2003, a New Jersey State superior judge dismissed a lawsuit against the state
brought by seven gay couples who sought the right to marry. Id. Thejudge ruled that nothing within
the New Jersey Constitution guarantees same-sex marriage, and added that the state legislature is
the proper forum for such change. Id. The case is being appealed to the state supreme court, and
because it has a history of protecting civil rights, advocates ofsame-sex marriage are optimistic that
the court with look favorably on their case. Id. See also Laura Mansnerus, MassachusettsRuling
on Gay MarriageBolsters Hopes in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at BI0. "Gay and
lesbian couples who want to marry lost a round in New Jersey two weeks ago, but the
Massachusetts Supreme Court's ruling that same-sex couples have the right to marry is expected
to bolster the New Jersey case as it goes to a higher court." Id.
148. Morris v. Sadler (No. 49D 13-021 I-PL-00 1946). Three same-sex couples who have a civil
union in Vermont filed a suit asking that the state of Indiana recognize their civil unions and afford
them the all the rights the union carries in the state of Vermont. Id. This is the first such case since
Vermont passed civil union legislation. Id. This case directly raises the question of the full faith and
credit clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, Indiana's DOMA does not require the state to
recognize the union or marriage of same-sex couples from other states. Id. It remains to be seen
what will result from this groundbreaking case. Id.
149. See generallyRobert F. Williams, Old ConstitutionsandNew Issues: NationalLessons
from Vermont's State ConstitutionalCase on MarriageofSame-Sex Couples,43 B.C. L. REV. 73
(2001). The Baker decision demonstrated the current legislative possibilities of civil unions when
it used a historical and contextual analysis of Vermont's constitution, before remanding the issue
to the legislature. This approach by the court represents a trend, in which state constitutions are
being interpreted to grant more protection than the federal Constitution. Consequently, there is
some speculation that Vermont is leading the way on the interpretation of state constitutions known
as "New Judicial Federalism."
150. See Arthur S. Leonard, Lesbian and Gay Familiesand the Law: A ProgressiveReport,
21 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 927, 927 (1994). "The movement for gay and lesbian rights proceeds in
stages." Id. If this is so, then those interested in parity should be interested in steps rather than pure
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for society in terms of equality for a minority group it is understandable
that they want immediate results. Unfortunately, civil rights movements
have little success in the world of immediate results. Same-sex marriage
is especially ill suited to win immediate success due to definitional
barriers' 5 ' that courts have championed.' 52
Civil unions should be seen as a viable option for proponents of samesex marriage.' 53 The new institution of union represents the best means
currently available for getting the ball rolling toward equality. 54 Progress
is progress; as long as same-sex couples insist on full marriage now, they
will miss out on the most time efficient means of securing the rights
heterosexual couples enjoy.
DOMA is the single biggest barrier to the recognition of same-sex
marriage. But the statute needs to be challenged if it is to change. 5 5 The
more states that adopt institutions like Vermont's civil unions, the better
the environment for challenging DOMA will become.
Small steps have already begun to tear down the reasoning behind
DOMA and its public support. Victories in the courts, such as Lawrence
v. Texas, the overturning of Bowers v. Hardwickand more general relevant
decisions such as Romer v. Evans, 56 and Zablocki v. Redhail,15' are
end states. The first phase, "[Il]egalization" has already started. Civil unions could help with the
next phases of gay and lesbian rights: "[n]ondiscrimination" and "[n]ormalization."
151.

JOHN WILLIAM MILLER, THE DEFINITION OF THE THING WITH SOME NOTES ON LANGUAGE

38 (1980). Reductio ad absurdum, any attempt to change the definition of marriage is met with
arguments that then say "all will be permitted" the method is not unlike Socrates' in the Republic
regarding competing definitions ofjustice. By this reasoning, divorce is hardly permissible. Id.
152. See generallyChistopher Rizzo, BanningState Recognition ofSame-Sex Relationships:
ConstitutionalImplicationsofNebraska'sInitiative416, 11 J.L. &POL'Y 1(2002). Legislation that
makes restrictions based on sexual orientation probably deserves more scrutiny than is afforded
when the public is eager for such restrictions.
153. See ACLU, Domestic Partnership,What's Possible?,ACLU.ORG, July 8, 2003 (listing
more information on the possibilities of civil unions or domestic partnerships), available at
http://www.aclu.org/getequal/rela/domesticl.html (last visited May 25, 2004).
154. See Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L.
REv. 15 (2000).
155. See Osofsky, supra note 45, at 85. "Someday we may look back at [Baker v. State], as
we now look upon Loving v. Virginia and wonder why same-sex marriages were a controversial
issue in the first place." Id.
156. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Barbara A. Robb, Note, The
Constitutionalityof the Defense of MarriageAct in the Wake ofRomer v. Evans, 32 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 263 (1997). The Romer decision could be seen to render DOMA unconstitutional. If DOMA
is sufficiently similar to Colorado's Constitutional Amendment 2, which precluded all legislative,
executive, or judicial action designed to protect people based on their homosexual orientation,
DOMA seems much less defensible as federal law.
157. In Zablockiv. Redhail,434 U.S. 374,385-88 (1978). The Supreme Court invalidated any
state law which foibad the remarriage of people who had outstanding child or spousal support
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chipping away at the prohibition to same-sex marriage in a piecemeal
fashion.' Additionally, new developments in domestic partnerships
statutes in California,'59 are granting all the rights of marriage to same sex
couples save joint tax filing. The title of marriage is missing, but the rights
are being granted.
Most notably, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has ruled that
forbidding same-sex marriage is contrary to the state constitution. 6 ° This
ruling represents another step toward parity. A celebration by proponents
of same-sex marriage would be premature. The ruling has already
galvanized the resistance to same-sex marriage. Constitutional
amendments to nullify the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling have
already picked up steam in Massachusetts as well as in Congress. Further,
Massachusetts is hardly on the same ideological playing field as the more
conservative Midwest and Plains states. 6 '
Finally, polling data suggests caution; America is not as receptive to
same-sex marriage as it is to civil unions. 6 2 Popular opinion suggests that
intolerance is unacceptable, but the Massachusetts Court is perceived as
having gone too far.'63 Civil unions remain the best and most logical
compromise on the road to equality for same-sex couples.

obligations. The Court's opinion stated, "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life" cannot be violated absent a finding of relevant social purpose. Id. at 385 (quoting
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
158. See generally Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle
Transformationin JudicialArguments Over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 893 (1996). Jacobs

contends that there are two rhetorical traditions in the realm of gay and lesbian issues in the
Supreme Court: one that sees gays as participators in deviant sexual practices worthy of the
majority's disdain and one that sees gays as victims and minorities. Surely, if the latter view of gays
in the law becomes more prevalent, same-sex marriage could become a reality.
159. In California,Equal Benefitsfor Partnersare Mandated,N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 2003, at
A23; New Domestic PartnerRights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2003, at A10.

160. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
161. See Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Religious Beliefs Underpin
Opposition to Homosexuality, PEOPLE-PREsS.ORG, Nov. 18, 2003, at http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?ReportlD=197 (last visited Apr. 26, 2004). The Pew Research
Center released polling data in October 2003 indicating that more people in the Eastern part of the
United States support "allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally" than in other parts of the
country. Of those polled living in the East, forty-two percent support same-sex marriage, whereas
only thirty-three percent of those polled living in the Midwest support same-sex marriage, and even
fewer people in the South, twenty-three percent, give their support.
162. See Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Gay Marriagea Voting Issue, but
Mostly for Opponents, PEOPLE-PRESS.ORG Feb. 27, 2004, at http://people-press.org/reports/
display.php3?ReportlD=204 (last visited May 25, 2004).
163. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, ConservativesMobilize Against Ruling on Gay Marriage,

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at A29.
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